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Abstract
Environmental distribution conlicts (EDCs) related to the construction and operation of waste incinerators have become 
commonplace in China. This article presents a detailed case study of citizen opposition to an incinerator in the village of 
Panguanying, Hebei Province. Drawing on in-depth ieldwork, we show how this case was notable, because it transcended 
the local arena to raise bigger questions about environmental justice, particularly in relation to public participation in sit-
ing decisions, after villagers exposed fraudulent public consultation in the environmental impact assessment. An informal 
network between villagers and urban environmental activists formed, enabling the Panguanying case to exert inluence far 
beyond the village locality. This network was critical in creating wider public debate about uneven power and substandard 
public participation in siting disputes, a central feature in many Chinese EDCs. By transcending local speciicities and expos-
ing broader, systemic inadequacies, this case became instrumental in supporting “strong sustainability”.
Keywords Environmental justice · Sustainability · Environmental networks · China · Waste incineration · Protest
Original research article
Environmental distribution conlicts (EDCs), deined as 
“mobilizations by local communities against particular eco-
nomic activities whereby environmental impacts are a key 
element of their grievances” (Temper et al. 2015: 261–2), 
have become widespread in China. Whilst they are often 
centred on community eforts to uphold social justice and 
protect their local environments, EDCs can also be impor-
tant by contributing to broader sustainability transitions 
(Scheidel et  al. 2017; Temper et  al. 2018; Herrero and 
Vilella 2017; Camisani 2018). They are driven by changes 
in social metabolism, namely “the manner in which human 
societies organize their growing exchanges of energy and 
materials with the environment” (Martinez-Alier et al. 2010: 
153). Although such changes beneit certain groups, others 
sufer from falling livelihoods, environmental degradation, 
and worsening public health (Martinez-Alier et al. 2010). 
Recent transformations in China’s industrial, economic, and 
social structures have spawned a wide range of EDCs, from 
large-scale urban protests over facilities such as chemical 
plants and waste incinerators, to protracted struggles over 
industrial pollution in rural areas (Lora-Wainwright et al. 
2012, 2017; Steinhardt and Wu 2016).
In China, EDCs centred on the construction and opera-
tion of waste incinerators have become particularly com-
monplace. Since 2004 China has been the world’s biggest 
waste generator, and by 2030 is predicted to generate double 
the amount of municipal solid waste produced in the United 
States (Hoornweg and Bhada-Tata 2012). An impending 
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“garbage crisis” (laji weiji) has resulted in major restructur-
ing of solid waste disposal. This includes a surge in con-
struction of “waste-to-energy” (WTE) incinerators, some of 
which can burn thousands of tonnes of waste per day (John-
son 2017).1 The Chinese state’s 12th 5-Year Plan targeted 
a tripling of the number of incinerators, from 103 in 2010 
to over 300 by the Plan’s end in 2015 (Johnson 2013: 357). 
As of February 2016, 231 incinerators were operational in 
China (Wuhu Ecology Center and Friends of Nature 2016).
WTE incineration is a lucrative sector in China. It fea-
tures a mixture of state-owned enterprises, Chinese private 
companies, and multinational corporations and beneits 
from preferential policies and tax breaks (Johnson 2017). 
Yet, there has been substantial opposition from communi-
ties that bear the brunt of incinerators detrimental to qual-
ity of life including, in some cases, public health (Balkan 
2012). Through our on-going work on the EJ Atlas project, 
we identiied 54 anti-incinerator EDCs in China. Most of 
these were identiied through an internet search and from 
information provided by Chinese environmental NGO activ-
ists. At time of writing, 11 cases had been entered into the 
EJ Atlas database (http://ejatl as.org), a collaborative project 
whose participants collect and upload case studies of social 
conlict surrounding environmental issues from around the 
world. These 11 cases are drawn from Beijing (Asuwei, 
Liulitun), Wuhan (Guodingshan), Guangdong Province 
(Luoding, Likeng, Panyu, Boluo, Qingshuihe), Hangzhou 
(Yuhang), Fujian Province (Qingpuling), and Hebei Prov-
ince (Panguanying). Contention over incinerators in these 
cases occurred between 2005 and 2014. In eight of these 
cases, citizen opposition was aimed at preventing incinera-
tors from being constructed, whilst in three of the cases, 
citizens fought existing facilities. In seven of these cases, 
community activists forged links (albeit to varying degrees) 
with Chinese environmental NGOs, particularly Beijing-
based Nature University, discussed in more detail below. In 
more than half of the cases, communities had been sufering 
from serious pollution for several years, mostly in the form 
of landills that existed long before the incinerators. And, 
seven of the cases resulted in the incinerators being relocated 
or indeinitely halted, and might, therefore, be considered 
“successful” cases for local residents. This high success rate 
is not representative of incinerator-related EDCs in China, 
however. As Yongshun Cai (2010) has demonstrated, there 
is often a positive relationship between media coverage of 
contention and its likelihood of success, because media 
reporting can expose local injustices to a wider audience 
and compel higher levels to intervene to shore up regime 
legitimacy. Yet, access to the media is not easily available 
to the majority of communities (Cai 2010). This greatly 
increases the diiculty of obtaining information on these 
cases so that they can be added to the EJ Atlas database. It is 
likely, therefore, that many disputes, particularly unsuccess-
ful cases, remain under the radar. Indeed, studies by Chinese 
scholars suggest that most cases of citizen contention are 
unsuccessful, and that this is particularly so in rural areas 
(e.g., Chen 2014; Zhang 2009).
Anti-incinerator conflicts—just like EDCs more 
broadly—are usefully analysed through the concept of 
environmental justice. This concept is premised upon the 
assumption that “generalised social injustices are manifest 
in environmental conditions, among other ways” (Schlos-
berg 2013: 40). Early applications of an environmental jus-
tice framework focused on the uneven distribution of toxic 
pollution to racial and ethnic minority and low-income 
communities in the United States (see for instance Bullard 
1990). Since then, the concept has been applied to a growing 
range of issues, including climate change and biodiversity 
conservation, and has encompassed aspects of recognition 
and procedural justice (Schlosberg 2007; Sze and London 
2008; Walker 2009). In addition, environmental justice 
frameworks have increasingly been applied beyond West-
ern liberal democracies (see, for example, McDonald 2002; 
Williams and Mawdsley 2006; Carruthers 2008; Özkaynak 
et al. 2015), although rarely so in the case of China (for 
exceptions see Lora-Wainwright 2017; Ma 2010; Xie 2011). 
These studies show that the speciic contexts in which envi-
ronmental justice movements develop strongly impacts their 
ability to trigger broader sustainability transformations 
(Martinez-Alier et al. 2016; Schneidel et al. 2018). In the 
United States, for example, disparate campaigns in the foot-
steps of the infamous Love Canal case scaled up to become 
a powerful environmental justice movement (Szasz 1994).
This article contributes to the debate surrounding “why, 
through whom, how, and when” EDCs result in social jus-
tice and environmental sustainability (Scheidel et al. 2017) 
through a detailed study of a Chinese anti-incinerator cam-
paign centred on the village of Panguanying in Hebei Prov-
ince. This EDC was notable, because more than any other 
case in our database, it transcended the local arena to raise 
bigger questions about environmental justice—particularly 
in relation to public participation in siting decisions—and 
challenged the desirability of incineration more generally. 
Crucial to this, was the (strategic) focus on procedural jus-
tice and on legal avenues adopted by the key village cam-
paigners. This was facilitated by high levels of interaction 
between villagers and members of a Beijing-based network 
of environmental activists comprising NGO activists, legal 
professionals, academics and journalists, who visited the vil-
lage and provided support. We know from interviews that 
the Panguanying case generated a particularly high level of 
1 The city of Shenzhen is currently constructing the world’s biggest 
waste-to-energy incinerator, which will burn 5,000 tonnes of waste 
every day (South China Morning Post 2011). The 2008 Trial Meas-
ures on Environmental Information Disclosure enable citizens to 
apply for disclosure of certain types of information.
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outsider support, which was partly due to the village’s prox-
imity to the capital and the perceived signiicance of the case 
according to urban activists. Networks have been analysed 
as important organisational structures that can help further 
environmental justice claims and facilitate EDCs, which play 
a crucial role in promoting sustainability transitions (Schlos-
berg 1999; Scheidel et al. 2017). Recently, their importance 
has been highlighted also in the Chinese context (see below 
for more details). In the case of Panguanying, we show how 
networking with actors beyond the village helped open legal 
channels otherwise beyond most ordinary villagers’ reach, 
and brought the case to a wider audience.
In line with environmental justice literature, the Pan-
guanying case shows how EDCs do not just arise out of 
distribution of ecological harms, but also due to the uneven 
distribution of power and participation. Indeed, lack of efec-
tive public participation and transparency are regularly con-
tested in Chinese EDCs, and improving them is a key focus 
of environmental NGO activity. In the Panguanying case, as 
we shall see, campaigners uncovered evidence of system-
atic fraud concerning the public participation element of 
the environmental impact assessment (EIA). This discovery, 
and the legal contestation surrounding it, was vital to the 
campaign’s success. Consequently, Chinese environmen-
tal activists viewed Panguanying as an exemplary case in 
highlighting widespread problems associated with the EIA 
process for waste incinerators and with limited public par-
ticipation to a wider (national) audience. By transcending 
local speciicities and shining a light on broader, systemic 
inadequacies, this case became instrumental in supporting 
“strong sustainability” (Scheidel et al. 2017).
The next section reviews the social movement literature 
on environmental networks, showing how this relates to 
what we know about environmental activism in China. We 
then examine how and why Chinese urban environmental 
activists have started to forge links with grassroots commu-
nities faced with serious pollution threats. The substantive 
body of the article presents a close and systematic analysis 
of the Panguanying case. Finally, in the “Discussion” and 
“Conclusion” sections, the article builds on this original data 
to elucidate the relationship between EDCs, environmental 
justice, and sustainability transitions in China.
Environmental networks
Environmental networks are manifested in a multitude of 
diferent forms, ranging from enduring, formal alliances, to 
“temporary coalitions” between environmental organisations 
and “not in my backyard” (NIMBY) campaigners (Saunders 
2013: 28). In the Chinese context, Wells-Dang (2012) dis-
tinguishes between four network types: formal “coalitions” 
featuring hierarchical structures and large memberships; 
forums designed for information sharing between mem-
bers; informal networks that may combine organisational 
and individual members; and personal networks that exist 
between individuals.
Although the diversity found in networks can be a source 
of strength, it can also create tension that undermines col-
lective action (Heyman 2011). Existing studies of environ-
mental activism have highlighted tension between the envi-
ronmentalism of the wealthy—sometimes linked to Ronald 
Inglehart’s post-materialist thesis (Inglehart 1977), whereby 
people only start to care about the environment when they 
are not concerned with basic material needs—and the “envi-
ronmentalism of the poor”, where conlicts are localised and 
rooted in the inequitable distribution of ecological costs and 
beneits (Guha and Martinez-Alier 2013). Scholarship has 
also illustrated potential and related tension between locally 
focused campaigns often aimed at securing compensation 
(or “weak sustainability”) and broader social movements 
concerned with “strong sustainability” and premised on the 
value of the environment per se (see Martinez-Alier 1998, 
cited in; Scheidel et al. 2017). Harvey, for instance, viewed 
the “militant particularism” of poor groups as a barrier to 
social movement formation (Harvey 1996), and Piller argued 
that mutual suspicion between NGOs and community activ-
ists constrained network formation and scale shift (Piller 
1991).
But, as the case of Panguanying will illustrate, diversity 
in aims and environmental discourses initially embraced is 
not always an obstacle; indeed, it can be transcended in pro-
ductive ways. Some studies have shown how broad, cross-
cultural coalitions that combine, or “hybridize”, diferent 
types of environmental discourse can bridge divides between 
campaigns (Pirkey 2012). Crucially, such encounters do not 
simply involve a one-way transfer of resources from privi-
leged to poor (as a resource mobilisation approach might 
imply). Rather, new dynamics and understandings of issues 
can form through “friction” (Tsing 2005) produced where 
diverging groups and interests meet. For example, Gottlieb 
(2001) showed how tension between diferent manifesta-
tions of environmental concern in the United States stimu-
lated the adoption of new tactics and concerns, resulting in 
the rejuvenation of an environmental movement viewed as 
overly centralised, hierarchical, and lacking diversity (see 
also Schlosberg 1999).
China’s political and social context diverges signiicantly 
from countries that have been the subject of most environ-
mental justice scholarship, including the United States. 
For many years, environmental protection was relegated to 
secondary importance behind economic development. In 
the past decade, however, environmental issues have risen 
up the political agenda and now form a crucial element of 
oicials’ evaluation processes (Kostka 2015). The Minis-
try of Environmental Protection (and its predecessor, the 
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State Environmental Protection Administration), has found 
common ground with environmental activists committed 
to improving environmental governance within China’s 
one-party system (Johnson 2014). This includes eforts to 
promote greater public participation and transparency as 
a means to hold local oicials accountable for not follow-
ing environmental laws and regulations. Despite this, many 
party-state oicials remain ambivalent at best to environ-
mental activists, fearing that they may undermine local eco-
nomic growth or social stability.
Initially, studies on environmentalism in China also 
examined quests for weak and strong sustainability as 
though they existed in separation. One group of studies on 
the latter (strong sustainability) has focused on “environ-
mentalist” NGOs (Johnson 2010), particularly in relation to 
the issues of nature conservation (Economy 2004; Sun and 
Zhao 2008) and anti-hydropower campaigning (Liu 2013; 
Mertha 2008), and in terms of their relationships with the 
Party-state (Ho and Edmonds 2008). Meanwhile, another 
body of work has examined how ordinary citizens respond to 
localised pollution (Jing 2000; Lora-Wainwright 2017; Stern 
2013; Tilt 2010; Van Rooij 2010; Van Rooij et al. 2012), 
how grassroots communities play a role in conservation 
eforts (Coggins 2003; Hathaway 2013; Herrold-Menzies 
2009), and about how communities in ethnic minority areas 
engage with environmental issues (Yeh 2009). Together, 
these two groups of studies have (sometimes only implicitly) 
shown how activism occurs at diferent points on a spectrum 
bookended by “embedded in the state” NGOs on the one 
hand (Ho and Edmonds 2008), and rural pollution victims, 
who are often “isolated” from intermediary support, on the 
other (Van Rooij 2010).
While early studies of Chinese environmental activism 
often made ENGOs their unit of analysis, recent work has 
focused more on individual activists and networks. Such 
studies have examined activists’ participation in transna-
tional and regional networks (Wells-Dang 2012; Hathaway 
2013; Wu 2013), and how they forge mutually beneicial 
connections with elites, particularly those within the Party-
state (Ho and Edmonds 2008; Spires 2011). Mertha (2008) 
showed how China’s highly fragmented policy-making 
process provided a structural opportunity for the forma-
tion of anti-hydropower coalitions involving state and non-
state actors (Mertha 2008). Wells-Dang (2012), who also 
examined anti-hydropower campaigning in China, similarly 
focused on the role of “urban elites”. The crucial role that 
elite allies can play in environmental contention in China has 
also prominently featured in the Chinese literature including 
in relation to anti-incinerator campaigns (e.g., Guo and Chen 
2011), but little research has been done on the dynamics of 
network formation between elites and community activists. 
One partial exception is Tan and Ren’s (2017) comparison of 
an environmental NGO and a community action group both 
involved in a campaign against construction of an incinerator 
at Asuwei in Beijing. They highlight the large discrepancy in 
capabilities and resources between these two groups, which 
resulted in limited cooperation, and advocate closer links 
between communities and environmental NGOs in future 
(Tan and Ren 2017). In contrast, we show how community 
and NGO activists worked together closely in the Panguany-
ing case.
Whilst existing analyses present a signiicant step for-
ward in identifying potential crossovers between weak and 
strong sustainability and highlighting the complex inter-
actions between a range of actors, few studies, in Chinese 
or English, have examined the dynamics of environmental 
networks in China. Most studies of environmental activism 
that aims to prevent construction of potentially polluting 
projects focus on case studies in urban areas (e.g., Chen 
2012; Lang and Xu 2013; Johnson 2013). One exception, a 
study by Bondes and Johnson (2017) which also examines 
the Panguanying case, pays attention to networks but does 
not explain in detail how they formed, or explicitly examine 
their potential contribution to sustainability transitions.
The Panguanying case requires and enables a diferent 
type of analysis from these previous studies, one that com-
bines attention to grassroots sensibilities (in this case, those 
of the villagers), the networks that they became part of, and 
the ways in which they intersected and interacted. These 
encounters did not engender tensions but rather the grad-
ual transcendence of the campaign’s signiicance from the 
locality itself to a broader anti-incineration network, as their 
aims converged. Conversely, our article documents mutual 
feedback between local campaigners and a wide spectrum 
of urban activists (see Martinez-Alier et al. 2014). The lan-
guage, focus and strategies used by village-based campaign-
ers drew from insights they gleaned from other successful 
urban campaigns, but their success also provided crucial 
support to the agenda of professional environmentalists and 
environmental lawyers. The case also furnished lessons 
about the importance of public participation and procedural 
justice in the quest for strong sustainability.
Our analysis below is based on in-depth interviews with 
key members of the urban environmental network that we 
conducted periodically between 2012 and 2017. We also 
visited Panguanying on several occasions between 2012 and 
2016. Johnson interviewed several key village-based cam-
paigners in 2012 after learning about the case from Zhao 
Zhangyuan, a retired Chinese Academy of Sciences pro-
fessor and outspoken critic of incineration who had visited 
Panguanying previously to ofer support to villagers (more 
details below). In 2013, all three co-authors went to Pan-
guanying to conduct further interviews with key campaign-
ers. We employed a snowballing technique and interviewed 
several other villagers involved in the campaign. However, 
our eforts to interview a wider range of villagers including 
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some who may not have been directly involved in the case 
were undermined when local oicials in Panguanying told us 
to cease our ieldwork there. While, as a Chinese researcher, 
Lu was able to carry out follow-up research and interview a 
wider range of stakeholders, particularly through employing 
the help of students, Johnson and Lora-Wainwright had to 
abandon plans for subsequent ieldwork and limit themselves 
to interviews with a small number of key villagers who met 
with us in a nearby city. Our analysis is also based on more 
than 40 documents, including petition letters and court deci-
sions, which we obtained from leading village activists.
Pathways to network formation: the urban 
perspective
Informal networking, based on personal as opposed to insti-
tutional linkages, is increasingly recognized as an important 
feature of China’s environmental movement (Wells-Dang 
2012). Beijing is a key hub in this regard. It is home to an 
informal environmental network (hereinafter referred to as 
the “Beijing environmental network”) comprising NGO 
staf, journalists, lawyers, and academics that has advo-
cated, among other things, greater environmental transpar-
ency, public participation, and more sustainable solutions to 
China’s waste challenge.
Whilst Chinese NGOs were previously believed to shun 
links with pollution victims (Ho and Edmonds 2008), in 
recent years, Beijing environmental network members have 
reached out to local communities opposed to incinerators 
and other forms of pollution. Steinhardt and Wu (2016) 
claim that media commercialisation and the spread of the 
internet and social media, declining risks associated with 
protest, and improved NGO capacity have all facilitated this 
growing collaboration between policy advocates and protes-
tors. In addition, we ind that this development was partly 
due to frustration among certain environmental activists 
concerning NGOs’ lack of community engagement, which 
was part of their “self-imposed censorship” deemed neces-
sary for organisational survival in China’s one-party-state 
(Ho and Edmonds 2008). In the words of one NGO leader, 
“my biggest gripe was that NGOs didn’t dare to engage with 
real issues” (NGOs bu gan jieru xianshi). Another impor-
tant development was the state’s promotion of governance 
reforms nominally designed to empower the public to hold 
polluters to account (Johnson 2010). By focusing on pro-
cedural deiciencies including perceived lack of oicial 
transparency and public consultation, urban middle class 
protestors shared similar ground with NGOs, yet the latter 
remained largely disconnected from protests (Johnson 2010).
In this context, environmental journalist Feng Yongfeng 
established the NGO Nature University (Ziran Daxue), 
which has pioneered a more “grassroots” approach to 
environmental activism. An organisation in its own right, 
Nature University has also become a hub, or “clearing 
house”, for environmentalists in Beijing, for example, 
through holding regular seminars on environmental issues. 
Nature University has begun ofering help to communities 
contesting waste incinerators and other forms of pollution. 
Once contact with a local community is established, Nature 
University sends staf members to the site with journalists 
and other “people who care about the issue”. A key aim 
of this approach is to attract external publicity, or, in other 
words, to transcend the local context. This serves two main 
purposes—pressurizing oicials into resolving problems 
through attracting the attention of higher levels and the 
wider public, and protecting local activists from retribu-
tion at the hands of local oicials. Instead of advocating 
disruptive tactics sometimes associated with NIMBY (not 
in my backyard) campaigns, Nature University encourages 
communities to utilize “legal weapons” as fully as possi-
ble. For example, in another anti-incinerator case at Hai’an 
in Jiangsu Province, Nature University helped villager Xie 
Yong, whose son Xie Yongkang was born with cerebral 
palsy. Xie Yong blamed this on the incinerator located only 
a couple of hundred metres from his home. Nature Univer-
sity helped Xie Yong contact the Centre of Legal Assistance 
for Pollution Victims (CLAPV), which represented him in 
an unsuccessful lawsuit against the incinerator company. 
Throughout this process, Nature University also helped Xie 
and his fellow villagers (unsuccessfully) apply for disclosure 
of the incinerator’s pollution data to use as legal evidence.2 
As of May 2013, Nature University had iled up to twenty 
such requests, and sued the Guangzhou Municipal Govern-
ment when it refused to disclose information about the city’s 
Likeng incinerator.
Aside from helping pollution victims, Nature University 
and other activists involved in the Beijing Environmental 
Network have a more normative goal. In the early 2000s, 
China’s Ministry of Environmental Protection (MEP) intro-
duced policies to stimulate public participation and trans-
parency, including in the EIA process (Johnson 2014). In 
helping local residents assert their “right to information, 
right to supervision, right to participation” (zhiqing quan, 
jiandu quan, canyu quan), network members hope to pro-
mote a more participatory form of environmental govern-
ance, which addresses the root causes of problems that cause 
EDCs in the irst place. As one NGO leader put it:
We aim to play the role of mediator and be a com-
munication bridge [between the public and the gov-
ernment]… We hope that, after an ignorant appeal 
2 The 2008 Trial Measures on Environmental Information Disclosure 
enable citizens to apply for disclosure of certain types of information.
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(bu ming bu bai de shangfang), we can examine why 
the appeal was ignorant, how to enable public partici-
pation, and how to resolve this problem. We need to 
return to the situation before the appeal took place, 
and see whether this project can continue. If it can 
continue, should there be more compensation? Should 
the site be changed? Is there a need to improve super-
vision of the facility? Only if these issues are properly 
addressed can these NIMBY cases result in a gradual 
improvement (emphasis added).
Another strand of Nature University’s work involves 
enabling pollution activists to share their experiences and 
to network with similar people from other locations. For 
example, in 2012, a workshop was held on “NIMBY cases in 
China” that resulted in an NGO report documenting over 20 
such “NIMBY” cases.3 The recent popularisation of social 
media and micro blogging—especially Weibo—has also 
facilitated communication between grassroots communities 
and urban activists (Bondes and Johnson 2017). Through 
this, otherwise “isolated” (Van Rooij 2010: 76), activists 
become networked into a broader activist community where 
they can share knowledge and experience. One NGO inform-
ant described Weibo as a “small command centre” (xiaoxing 
zhihuibu) that serves as a platform for sharing information 
and breaking issues out of local conines.
Network formation between urban and rural activists 
is not just a top–down process. It is contingent upon sev-
eral local level factors, including grassroots leadership. We 
examine these factors next through a case study of the Pan-
guanying anti-incinerator campaign.
The Panguanying anti‑incinerator campaign
In 2008, the Qinhuangdao Municipal Government decided to 
construct a waste incinerator in the village of Panguanying, 
approximately 35 km away from the city yet only 200 metres 
from the nearest homes. Villagers were excluded from the 
decision-making process and denied even the most basic 
information about the project. Instead they were viewed as 
potential obstacles to be overcome rather than as partici-
pants in the decision-making process. The decision-making 
process was deliberately structured to guarantee support 
from village leaders and neutralize potential opposition 
from local people through denying them a voice. Although 
local oicials advertised a public comment period in line 
with EIA Law requirements, they did this through placing 
small notices in the county government, which were not 
seen (and not meant to be seen) by villagers. Then, in early 
2009, with the project having been approved “in principle” 
by various local government departments, inspection trips 
to other incinerators operated by Weiming, the private com-
pany in charge of constructing and operating the Panguany-
ing incinerator, were arranged. Although the Hebei Provin-
cial Environmental Protection Bureau (EPB) subsequently 
claimed that these visits had successfully dispelled any fears 
concerning incineration that residents might have had, par-
ticipants only comprised a handful of local oicials who 
were likely to approve of the project or at least not oppose 
it. The only village representative included on these trips 
was Panguanying Party Secretary Qiao Yanli, who had been 
accused of corruption and was deeply unpopular amongst a 
signiicant portion of villagers.
The Panguanying incinerator only became common 
knowledge in mid-April 2009 when Qiao led a group 
of workers to measure the land for the project. He was 
approached by Pan Zuofu, a member of one of Panguany-
ing’s “teams” (the smallest administrative designation which 
refers to a sub-village unit), which controlled 14 mu (a little 
less than a hectare) of farmland designated for the incinera-
tor. Pan Zuofu became involved in a heated discussion about 
compensation levels, which he found thoroughly inadequate. 
Qiao retored that, with higher levels backing the incinerator 
project, any resistance would be “futile”.
Pan Zuofu enlisted support from his uncle Pan Qing-
wen, who belonged to the same farming team and whose 
interests were, therefore, also under threat, as well as other 
sympathetic villagers. They appealed at multiple levels 
via the letters and visits (xinfang) system that provides an 
institutionalised channel through which citizens can lodge 
complaints against oicials, claiming that the land expro-
priation was illegal and that the decision-making process 
contained procedural laws. They claimed that their land was 
“basic farmland” (jiben nongtian), and not, as local oi-
cials claimed yuandi (literally, “garden land”). This mattered 
because according to Chinese law expropriation of the for-
mer requires central government approval whilst the latter 
does not. However, local oicials rebufed the men’s com-
plaints, and the Hebei EPB approved the project’s EIA in 
May 2009, allowing construction to begin. Undeterred, the 
villagers repeatedly contacted the National Land Resources 
Ministry, which in September 2009 compelled the local 
county government to halt the project until proper proce-
dures related to the land issue had been followed. Shortly 
thereafter those procedures were completed and construc-
tion resumed.4
3 On ile with the authors.
4 One key stakeholder that we interviewed insisted that oicials had 
covertly altered the land designation from basic agricultural land to 
yuandi in order that these procedures could be completed.
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Reframing opposition: from land to health
The incinerator issue was soon reframed from a land dis-
pute involving a handful of afected villagers to a major 
public health issue. First, a villager formerly employed as 
an environmental protection oicer for a local paper mill 
warned that burning waste could cause the release of diox-
ins, a harmful pollutant. Then, on 1 September 2009, China 
Central Television (CCTV) aired an episode of Half Hour 
Economy (Jingji Ban Xiaoshi) entitled Dioxins are Tor-
menting China (Er’eying Kunrao Zhongguo).5 A major 
international conference on dioxins had recently been held 
in Beijing, where several recent anti-incinerator protests 
motivated in part by fears concerning dioxin emissions 
had occurred (Johnson 2013). The Half Hour Economy 
episode dramatized the link between dioxins and cancer, 
and interviewed Professor Zhao Zhangyuan. The episode 
also featured interviews with anti-incinerator campaigners 
from Liulitun, a Beijing suburb where residents had been 
opposing a planned incinerator since 2006. Through this, 
Panguanying villagers discovered that other communities 
were also struggling against incinerators. Importantly, the 
realization that the incinerator could threaten public health 
inspired a third villager, Pan Zhizhong, to join the campaign. 
He distributed copies of Dioxins are Tormenting China and 
other materials from the internet to local people to raise 
awareness. This resulted in 1500 villagers (from Panguany-
ing and surrounding villages) signing a petition against the 
incinerator (Shang 2013). Pan Zhizhong then visited every 
village within a 5-km radius of the incinerator site and col-
lected handwritten statements from 37 village heads express-
ing opposition to the project.6
The Liulitun case strongly inluenced Panguanying vil-
lagers. There, campaigners had articulated persuasive, facts-
based arguments against the incinerator project (Johnson 
2013). Liulitun residents produced a detailed 44-page report 
[hereinafter referred to as the “Liulitun Report”] outlining 
their rationale and strategies for opposing the incinerator, 
and uploaded it to the internet. They also fully utilised legal 
channels, challenging the project based on errors in the sit-
ing process such as factual mistakes and lack of public par-
ticipation (Johnson 2013). They did this through hiring envi-
ronmental lawyer Xia Jun, who helped campaigners contest 
the project’s EIA through an administrative review applica-
tion. They also peacefully surrounded MEP headquarters 
in Beijing on World Environment Day 2007 to demand the 
problem’s resolution. In response, the MEP called for the 
project’s suspension pending further investigation, and the 
planned incinerator was later relocated (Johnson 2013).
Relecting on the Half Hour Economy episode, one lead-
ing campaign participant said,
Lots of national experts said that it’s best to keep 
incinerators to a minimum because they are harmful 
to health… We subsequently saw the [Liulitun report], 
and downloaded it from the Internet…we saw that 
Liulitun residents had iled a lawsuit, and there was a 
lawyer, Xia Jun. We decided to also contact a lawyer, 
because [in relation to the Liulitun Report] we can’t 
write this kind of thing, we don’t understand environ-
mental law, so we contacted Xia Jun.
In June 2010, Panguanying campaigners produced their 
own ten-page report.7 It resembled the Liulitun document, 
including scientiic assertions that incinerators pose a health 
hazard and claims that, by excluding the public, the siting 
decision contravened laws and regulations. Then, in sum-
mer 2010, the Pans travelled to Beijing to meet with Zhao 
Zhangyuan and Xia Jun. Both men, together with several 
Nature University activists, subsequently visited Panguany-
ing to provide technical information about the dangers of 
incineration and advise the Pans about how to contest the 
incinerator. Lawyer Xia agreed to represent the villagers, 
and in September 2010 helped them ile an administrative 
review application challenging the Hebei EPB’s decision to 
approve the incinerator project’s EIA on ive grounds:
• The project had not been included in municipal govern-
ment plans;
• The project contravened national government policies, 
including protection of groundwater and arable land, and 
of a nearby scenic zone;
• There was no evidence about how dioxin emissions 
would be kept within safe standards;
• The EIA did not consider, among other things, incinera-
tor sludge and ash treatment, and monitoring of dioxins;
• The EIA violated the law because public opinion wasn’t 
solicited and there was insuicient information disclo-
sure.
The MEP accepted the administrative review application 
but ultimately upheld the EPB’s decision. Villagers contin-
ued to ile administrative reviews into other aspects of the 
case, including the land designation issue, yet these eforts 
were also rebufed. Then, in 2011, again with Xia’s help, 
they iled an administrative litigation lawsuit at the Shiji-
azhuang Qiaoxi District People’s Court against the Hebei 
5 The online link to this programme no longer works. It is possible 
to ind an abridged, ive-minute version on the Internet (available at 
http://my.tv.sohu.com/us/52230 36/36287 61.shtml ).
6 After coming under pressure from the Township government, two 
village heads revoked their complaints (Shang 2013). 7 On ile with the authors.
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EPB’s decision to approve the EIA. The case was accepted 
and both sides submitted evidence in advance of the court 
case. During that process, villagers stumbled on a discovery 
that transformed the case.
Fraudulent public participation: the smoking gun
The China Meteorological Association (Qixiang Ju) (CMA) 
had conducted the EIA. In evidence submitted to the MEP 
during the 2010 administrative review process, the provin-
cial EPB claimed results from 100 questionnaires issued to 
local residents as part of the EIA process indicated “strong 
public support” (jun tongyi) for the project. Residents sus-
pected foul play, but lacked evidence to verify their suspi-
cions. Amazingly, however, this changed when, during the 
evidence-collecting period for the administrative litigation 
lawsuit, the plaintifs obtained the full EIA report from 
the EPB. According to Xia Jun, the court was known to be 
relatively strict, and would likely not allow either side to 
add evidence after proceedings began. He speculated that 
this explained why the EPB, perhaps unaware of any prob-
lems with the EIA, submitted the full version as evidence. 
After obtaining the EIA, the anti-incinerator campaigners 
quickly determined that the questionnaire survey had been 
completely falsiied, providing them with an incontrovert-
ible “smoking gun” that proved procedural malpractice. For 
example, some survey responses had been attributed to vil-
lagers who had died or left the village long ago. The 64 
“respondents” still living in the village denied participating 
in the survey. They signed statements indicating that they 
opposed the incinerator, and that the questionnaires were 
fake. Upon receiving this news, villagers notiied Nature 
University, which wrote to the MEP and contacted a Phoenix 
Weekly journalist who visited Panguanying and reported on 
the case (Bondes and Johnson 2017).8
Evidence concerning the fake questionnaires proved 
decisive in stopping construction of the incinerator for a 
second time. In March 2011, the Hebei EPB halted the pro-
ject and announced that it would not approve any EIAs in 
Qinhuangdao until the new incinerator EIA had been passed 
with proper public consultation. On 27 May, the Hebei EPB 
oicially revoked the EIA, and 2 weeks later the court con-
irmed that villagers had withdrawn their lawsuit. As of 
October 2017, construction has not resumed, and villagers 
employed by Weiming to watch over the half-built incinera-
tor have begun to cultivate vegetables again within its walls.
The aftermath: negotiating a stalemate
Whilst the halting of the incinerator project was regarded 
as a major victory for campaigners, the half-built structure 
still literally and iguratively loomed over the village. Cam-
paigners worried that the EIA would be rectiied, allowing 
the project to resume as planned. Rather than claiming an 
outright victory then, campaigners’ eforts had resulted in 
an uneasy stalemate (jiangju).
The Hebei EPB’s revoking of the EIA did not, there-
fore, spell an end to the EDC. In March 2011, villagers 
challenged the MEP to hold the CMA accountable for the 
shoddy EIA, and attempted to sue the MEP when it refused 
to do so. However, the court case was not accepted. Several 
Beijing-based NGOs were also committed to improving the 
performance of units conducting EIAs. For example, after 
discovering similar problems with public consultation for 
another EIA—also conducted by the CMA—in relation to 
the Sujiatuo incinerator in suburban Beijing, ive NGOs 
issued an open letter calling for the CMA’s licence for con-
ducting EIAs to be stripped. This call was not heeded. Vil-
lagers also challenged Weiming’s application to conduct 
an initial public ofering (IPO). Companies are required 
to obtain approval from the MEP before launching an IPO 
to prevent highly polluting companies from being listed; 
Weiming had requested MEP approval in December 2010. 
Villagers claimed that the fraudulent EIA rendered Weim-
ing unit to launch its IPO. However, the MEP announced 
that, because the IPO application had occurred before the 
problems with the Panguanying case emerged, Weiming was 
eligible to proceed with its IPO. These examples highlight 
the diiculties associated with translating local case-based 
issues into wider struggles.
Back in Panguanying, in 2012, Pan Zhizhong stood for 
election as village head after villagers had forced Qiao Yanli 
to step down. Pan believed that this would enable him to 
deal a fatal blow to the project. Several environmental activ-
ists went to Panguanying to witness the election and ofer 
protection to Pan, who was coming under severe pressure 
from pro-incinerator forces. However, this election, and a 
subsequent one, was disrupted by local thug allegedly linked 
to Township oicials, leaving the village without a head for 
several years.
In late 2012, in a clear signal that they wanted to resume 
the project following 2 years of inaction, Weiming attempted 
to negotiate with Pan Zhizhong and Pan Zuofu. The two men 
agreed to have lunch with Weiming representatives, during 
which Pan Zhizhong reasserted his intention to stand for vil-
lage head and oppose the incinerator (Shang 2013). Weiming 
also invited members of the environmental network—includ-
ing Mao Da, Chen Liwen, Feng Yongfeng, Zhao Zhangy-
uan, and Xia Jun—to visit an incinerator in Jiangsu Prov-
ince, which they accepted. However, scope for cooperation 
8 See http://news.ifeng .com/fhzk/detai l_2011_03/01/49057 32_0.shtml .
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between the two sides was limited. When Weiming asked 
Mao Da if network members could mediate between it and 
the villagers, he insisted that the format should be a waste 
management forum where all issues could be openly debated 
and covered by the media. However, Weiming refused, and 
mediation failed, leaving the issue unresolved.
Discussion
Several factors contributed to the formation of a loose net-
work between village-based activists and a range of anti-
incineration activists and experts, which in turn enabled 
the case to transcend its local signiicance and become 
regarded as a ‘classic’ case that activists could learn from. 
Most basically, local campaigners’ focus on participation 
and procedural justice allowed their interests to merge 
with those of professional anti-incineration campaigners. 
Framing environmental justice claims in the language of 
procedural justice is a well-practiced strategy for Chinese 
environmental activists, and belongs to a broader tendency 
to depoliticise environmental politics (Ho and Edmonds 
2008). Indeed, much contention in China relies upon 
identifying and drawing attention to misimplementation 
of laws and regulations and taking advantage of cleavages 
within the state (O’Brien and Li 2006). Oicial state sup-
port for public consultation in relation to siting decisions 
enabled villagers to challenge the project on procedural 
grounds, since they had not been adequately consulted. 
This was also vital in supporting the development of this 
rural–urban anti-incineration network. Legal reforms 
promoting public participation are enabling NGOs to out-
grow their reliance on personal connections with party-
state oicials, or, in Ho and Edmonds’ (2008) words, their 
“embeddedness” and to work more closely with afected 
communities. Contingent political circumstances also pre-
sented a timely opportunity: activists attributed the Shi-
jiazhuang court decision in favour of the villagers to the 
prior departure of the Provincial EPB Head. This meant 
that the EIA approval could be suspended without causing 
him to lose face.
Closely related to this convergence of focus is a con-
vergence of language between village activists and profes-
sional environmentalists who collaborated with them. Very 
much in this vein, village-based campaigners in Panguany-
ing adopted some of the discourses of justice and recogni-
tion employed by members of the Beijing anti-incineration 
network. For example, one villager stated that:
When we sued the government, we didn’t want 
money, we wanted accountability. Even if they give 
me one Yuan, I don’t mind, as long as the govern-
ment loses. We can ring an alarm bell in China, that 
public participation is being incorrectly carried out, 
so that when other places build something they have 
to consider public participation, obtain everyone’s 
agreement. We don’t want money, we’re interested 
in justice.
Similarly, despite limited opportunities for networking 
with other communities, leading campaigners in the Pan-
guanying case publicly shunned the “NIMBY” label and 
acknowledged the wider (strong) sustainability issues con-
cerning waste management. One campaigner stated that he 
wanted the half-built incinerator to be transformed into an 
environmental protection museum. And, in August 2017, 
a Nature University activist involved in the Panguanying 
case revealed she was discussing the possibility of using 
the village as a site for a pilot project in waste reduction 
and sorting with residents. Overall, as the Panguanying 
case shows, resorting to discourses of sustainability and 
justice serves as an increasingly desirable strategy for local 
campaigners to avoid the stigmatised NIMBY label. It also 
strengthens opportunities for collaboration with urban-
based, professional environmentalists including Beijing 
anti-incineration network members. Conversely, members 
of the network performed the role of ‘elite allies’ shining a 
spotlight on the village and exposing oicial malfeasance.
The charisma and strength of character of the people 
involved are crucial to the survival of any campaign, let 
alone its success and the possibility of networking with other 
campaigners. Although Pan Qingwen was incapacitated by a 
stroke early in the campaign, Pan Zhizhong and Pan Zuofu 
resolutely maintained their opposition. This incurred a high 
personal cost. They were threatened by local thugs and Pan 
Zuofu’s windows were smashed. Local oicials also (unsuc-
cessfully) attempted to persuade the three men to drop their 
campaign through applying pressure through relational ties, 
something that Deng and O’Brien (2013) refer to as “rela-
tional repression”. For example, one county leader alleg-
edly contacted Pan Zhizhong through a relative, and ofered 
him alternative accommodation outside of the village. Pan 
Zuofu’s cousin, a civil servant, advised him against con-
tinuing his opposition. But, both men refused to listen to 
these ofers/threats. Meanwhile, the Qinhuangdao Govern-
ment ofered to ind work for Pan Qingwen’s ive daughters, 
and to pay for treatment for his sick wife—he also refused 
this ofer. When Pan Qingwen’s application for minimum 
living guarantee was turned down, his daughters claimed 
that it was because of his involvement in the anti-incinerator 
campaign.
Opportunities for contact and mutual learning were 
central to supporting and protecting village-based activ-
ists, and in turn to the formation of this rural–urban net-
work. Technology and infrastructure played a key role in 
this regard. The proximity to Beijing (2 h by high-speed 
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rail), facilitated several face-to-face interactions between 
villagers and ENGO activists. The media, particularly the 
CCTV documentary, was also instrumental in supporting 
the rural–urban network. First and foremost, it made villag-
ers realise that theirs was not an isolated struggle. Second, 
it sounded alarm bells about the potential health efects of 
incineration in their vicinity, enabling their opposition to 
go beyond initial economistic concerns about loss of land 
and livelihood and to include concerns with health too. The 
latter provided a crucial shared ground with professional 
activists. Third, it provided a roadmap for their opposition to 
the incinerator based on the experience of Liulitun campaign 
and allowed them to identify and contact potential allies 
(such as lawyer Xia Jun).
While the formation and persistence of environmental 
networks requires and fosters some shared ground between 
the parties involved, it does not necessarily entail that they 
should share all their aims. Village campaigners were not 
primarily concerned with the kind of normative govern-
ance goals prioritised by Beijing Environmental Network 
members. As one NGO activist with close ties to the case 
commented, “[the villagers] just want to pull this project 
down once and for all”. In addition, apart from focusing on 
procedural issues, Panguanying villagers also framed their 
grievances in the language of distribution and recognition. 
This was evident in their ten-page report, the inal section 
of which was titled “Common People’s Opinions” (Baix-
ing Yijian). It drew a sharp distinction between urban areas 
as producers of waste that were being beautiied, and rural 
areas as dumping grounds populated by irrelevant and dis-
posable people. One passage stated that,
Villagers aren’t a group of fools, we also know to 
stand up and ight when our survival is threatened. 
Waste incineration came about because of cities. It 
cleaned city spaces whilst polluting vulnerable villag-
ers. Almost every aspect [of incinerators sited in rural 
areas] afects nearby villagers’ livelihoods, sacriicing 
their health in the short term to alleviate the waste 
problems that accompany urban development… We 
also want to survive, we also want environmental pro-
tection, and we also want to live with dignity.
Villagers’ examination of oicial documents concerning 
the siting decision revealed that Panguanying was chosen, 
because it was downwind from urban (chengzhen) areas 
and “some distance” (yiding juli) from residential areas, 
which was desirable in limiting “disturbance” (ganrao). Yet, 
according to villagers, almost 30,000 rural residents lived 
within ive kilometres of the incinerator site. This prompted 
one of the leading campaigners to ask rhetorically “are we 
not people too?”
In contrast, professional environmentalists seek to use 
grassroots cases to shape an ambivalent and contested 
regulatory landscape (Van Rooij et al. 2016). For example, 
Xia Jun had a vested interest in promoting the resolution 
of environmental disputes via legal means to expand the 
role of lawyers in environmental governance.9 Recounting 
a conversation with Peking University law professor Wang 
Jin, he stated,
we had been discussing law and public participation, 
we wanted to ind some cases, then [the Panguany-
ing] case came along, it was very “classic” (dianx-
ing).” I asked him why can’t lawyers help construc-
tors [of projects with potential environmental impact] 
with [conducting] public participation, which has been 
very problematic? But we feel it’s diicult, because 
the MEP and EPBs tend to reject lawyers, they think 
that the EIA system can handle everything, including 
legal service. We didn’t have a good example case to 
show our perspective. But the Panguanying case was 
one such case, it’s very classic, down to the level of 
fabrication [of the questionnaires], there was serious 
illegality.
Similarly, a Nature University staf member repeatedly 
suggested that Panguanying was a good “case” (anzi) from 
which to learn and for highlighting shortcomings in the EIA 
process and encourage other communities to also use legal 
channels to resolve EDCs. One of the main goals of urban 
activists is to raise societal awareness by enabling cases to 
enter the public sphere (jinru shehui de shijiao). The story 
of the faked questionnaires was highly newsworthy. Several 
media outlets, including the People’s Daily, reported on the 
fake questionnaires in an article entitled “EIA Unit Actu-
ally Engages in This Kind of Forgery” (Huanping jigou jing 
zheyang zaojia) after environmental activists tipped them 
of, and Zhao Zhangyuan wrote a blistering criticism of the 
project’s EIA process.10 In addition, Pan Zhizhong and Pan 
Zuofu have participated in seminars organised by Beijing 
activists. The irst time this happened was in 2010, after Xia 
Jun introduced the case to other network members. The two 
men travelled to Beijing and shared their story with activists 
and other people ighting against pollution. In 2013, shortly 
after our ield visit, the two men participated in a small con-
ference in Beijing on “NIMBY in China”, organised by the 
NGO Nature University. Their story was written up, along 
with 20 other cases, and included in the conference pro-
ceedings. Participation by local campaigners in such events 
9 For more information on the mixed motives of environmental law-
yers, see Stern 2013 Chap. 6.
10 http://zhaoz hangy uan.blog.sohu.com/16552 1477.html.
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organised by brokers and urban professional activists is cen-
tral to the establishment and strengthening of networks.
An important way in which individual, local campaigns 
become scaled up to broader signiicance is in their role as 
precedents. Several precedents were set in the Panguany-
ing case, including the release of the full EIA report and 
the decision to revoke the EIA approval after the discovery 
of malpractice in relation to the solicitation of public com-
ments. Given that public participation requirements are fre-
quently overlooked—something that is not helped by weakly 
worded legislation—Nature University, Xia Jun and other 
network members hoped that this case could highlight this 
problem and stimulate broader institutional reforms.
Whilst the network analysed in this article contributed 
crucially to the relatively “successful” conclusion of this 
case from the activists’ perspective, it was not the only fac-
tor. Panguanying’s proximity to Beijing, just two hours away 
by train, facilitated the involvement of environmental activ-
ists and the media in this case. There was also an element 
of luck—for example, the EPB’s decision to hand over the 
entire EIA report came as a surprise to Xia Jun (Bondes and 
Johnson 2017). And, one NGO activist who had participated 
in the case told us that waste disposal was not a particularly 
pressing issue in the region, and that local oicials were, 
therefore, not in a rush to construct an incinerator, something 
which contributed to the stalemate described above. Finally, 
the courage and determination of key village activists cannot 
be underestimated. All of these factors contributed to the 
outcome in this case.
Conclusion
Let us return to one of the questions leading this special 
issue: “why, through whom, how and when” do EDCs result 
in social justice and environmental sustainability (Scheidel 
et al. 2017) considering the Panguanying case and the net-
work which formed around it. Rural–urban environmental 
networks like the one surrounding Panguanying are a new 
form of movement organising in China. Schlosberg (1999: 
142) argued that “networks expand the notion of environ-
mental locality, as they expose the similarities shared by 
communities in disparate places”. Similarly, in the Pan-
guanying case, their most crucial efect is enabling what 
began as a place-based EDC to transcend the local level, 
giving it wider signiicance and potential to become a prec-
edent for subsequent campaigns. From the view point of 
local activists, the rural–urban network ampliied their voice 
and helped them challenge unjust decisions. Conversely, 
this network served the interests of professional activists 
by creating wider public debate surrounding the misimple-
mentaion of environmental regulations, mainly in relation 
to public participation in siting disputes, something viewed 
as an endemic issue in China.
Rural–urban networks like the one which emerged around 
Panguanying’s incinerator can go far beyond environmen-
tal issues in challenging multiple forms of domination 
(Schlosberg 1999). In the Panguanying case, the battle for 
recognition was rooted in the wider issue of citizenship and 
participation. These features of environmental justice are 
closely linked—as Schlosberg (2007: 25) noted, “if you are 
not recognized, you do not participate; if you do not par-
ticipate, you are not recognized”. Decision makers strived 
to render villagers invisible—they were not informed of the 
project and were completely excluded from the decision-
making process, culminating in the forged questionnaires. 
By fabricating locals’ approval, the EIA attempted to silence 
villagers while pretending that they had in fact been given a 
voice. Conversely, eforts by village campaigners and their 
allies in Beijing aimed to unmask injustices, both in terms 
of the lack of recognition of villagers’ views and potential 
efects on their health and livelihoods.
In discussing the potential for EDCs to contribute to 
strong sustainability, Scheidel et al. (2017) diferentiate 
between intermodal and intramodal conflicts. The for-
mer emerge within an established pattern of resource use 
between diferent social groups, whereas the latter defends 
a particular mode of resource use against industrial society’s 
attempts to transform it. The Panguanying case straddled 
these two categories. On the one hand, the village campaign-
ers’ primary goal was to prevent an incinerator being con-
structed in Panguanying, indicating an intermodal conlict. 
Yet, in doing so, they became increasingly aware about the 
dangers of incineration in general, and about shortcomings 
in the EIA process that robbed them of any agency. This 
intramodal aspect of the Panguanying case was also inlu-
enced by strategic imperatives and by urban activists whose 
concerns about incineration and environmental governance 
went far beyond the village itself. Engagement of activists 
such as the Pans can be both inter and intramodal, depending 
on the context—the two are not mutually exclusive.
The Panguanying case is an instance in which an EDC 
supports sustainability. This is not because the incinerator 
is on hold, but rather because it raises questions about the 
failings of the EIA process and engages with the question 
of incineration safety and desirability as a whole. Their 
proponents claim that waste incinerators represent a clean 
and eicient way of handling waste, and are preferable to 
landill. Yet, studies have cast doubt on this in China due to 
concerns that incinerators are not managed or regulated to 
high enough standards (Johnson 2013). One rare study of 
emissions from 19 Chinese incinerators found considerable 
variation, with some achieving EU standards and others fail-
ing to meet much laxer national standards (Ni et al. 2009). 
By becoming an exemplary case trumpeted by professional 
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activists and the media, Panguanying highlighted serious 
problems with the EIA process and showed how the rights 
and interests of vulnerable populations can be overlooked 
by planners. And as of late 2017, Nature University activists 
were in discussion with Panguanying residents about using 
the village as a pilot site for a rural waste reduction and sort-
ing project. At least three other cases in our sample—Aobei, 
Liulitun and Panyu—also resulted in community eforts in 
waste sorting and reduction (Johnson 2013). The case, there-
fore, supports Scheidel et al. (2017) argument that environ-
mental justice success can support wider eforts to improve 
sustainability.
Despite Panguanying case’s signiicance, the prospects 
for a scaling-up of anti-incinerator activism in China are 
highly constrained. The professional activist community is 
small and lacks resources. More importantly, the party-state 
maintains a strong aversion to linked up activism, particu-
larly between disparate afected communities, that may chal-
lenge its monopoly on political power. Hence, whilst there 
appears to be strong demand among grassroots and activ-
ist communities for a strong environmental justice move-
ment based on incinerators and other pollution problems, 
the prospects for this materialising appear bleak. The vast 
majority of EDCs will likely remain rooted in local power 
struggles. Yet, as the early stages of the Panguanying cam-
paign showed, materials related to other communities’ EDC 
experiences are still readily accessible through the Inter-
net. These discourses, which are rooted in broader concerns 
about the regulation and governance of environmental risks, 
will likely inform future EDCs even when campaigners fail 
to network with outside activists.
The level of networking in the Panguanying case 
exceeded that witnessed in most of the other anti-inciner-
ator cases documented so far in the EJ Atlas database. One 
reason why EDCs so often remain localised is that the rural 
grassroots level often provides an inhospitable environment 
for activism, even when it is perfectly legal. One urban envi-
ronmental activist recounted his experience in rural China:
I’m terriied to death of taking a photo [of pollution]. I 
don’t even dare to call the pollution reporting hotline. 
It’s like if you make a phone call you are commit-
ting a crime. It’s also not possible to tell the police. 
Sometimes people give me photos and ask me to report 
the situation, they are scared that the Public Security 
Bureau will ind them if they publicise the photos, they 
are scared of being arrested.
Because outside attention can result in local oicials 
being disciplined, they have a strong incentive to limit con-
tact between local campaigners and outsiders. The limita-
tions we faced whilst carrying out ieldwork may serve as 
additional illustration of these dynamics.
Environmental networks face obstacles both against hori-
zontal expansion (forging links between afected communi-
ties) and vertical expansion (between professional activists 
and afected communities) (Bondes and Johnson 2017). 
Regarding the latter, whilst the MEP introduced regulations 
to increase the scope of non-state involvement, in the Pan-
guanying case, it repeatedly turned a deaf ear to villagers’ 
appeals, choosing instead to side with local oicials. Even 
when the CMA had been guilty of serious wrongdoing on 
more than one occasion, the MEP did not take formal dis-
ciplinary action against it. The state’s ambivalence towards 
non-state actors (Stern 2013)—even when they have legiti-
mate demands—limits the potential for improvements in 
environmental governance within a one-party system. This is 
unfortunate, especially given that elite allies such as NGOs, 
journalists and lawyers help soften the boundaries between 
state and society and generally view their role as mediators 
instead of agitators.
As Temper et al. (2018) argue, EDCs can result in the 
creation of new norms and institutional structures that alter 
power relations resulting in “transformations to sustainabil-
ity”. This happens when EDCs coalesce into bigger move-
ments that “question the broader structures causing envi-
ronmental injustices” and whose approach “is often radical 
and broad-minded” (Scheidel et al. 2017). In China, any 
such transformations are most likely to occur when there 
is strong cooperation between state and non-state actors. 
Whilst a form of “depoliticised” (Ho and Edmonds 2008) 
environmental activism is tolerated by the state, this does 
not include radical movements intent on reconiguring power 
structures. For example, the battle to improve public par-
ticipation in environmental issues is an iterative process 
between sympathetic state actors and their policies, and non-
state activists who demand that those policies are adhered to. 
Yet, whilst Chinese leaders have thrown their weight behind 
energy eiciency and pollution reduction policies, making 
them key aspects of local oicial evaluation (see Wang 2013; 
Kostka 2015), the promotion of public participation as a 
means for enhancing environmental justice lacks high level 
political support. Although there are several challenges to 
EDCs scaling-up, the emergence of networks like the one 
surrounding Panguanying, however contingent, ofers some 
room for hope in the pursuit of strong sustainability.
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